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Tässä työssä tavoitteena oli kehittää uusi väitelausekkeisiin pohjautuva muodollinen 
varmennusmenetelmä Nokia Mobile Networks SoC R&D:llä käytettävien 
järjestelmäpiirimoduulien ohjelmistorajapintojen varmennukseen. Nykyiset käytössä 
olleet simulaatioihin pohjautuvat menetelmät eivät olleet huomanneet kaikkia vikoja 
ohjelmistorajapinnoista, joten tarvittiin uusi menetelmä korvaamaan tai tukemaan jo 
käytössä olevia simulointimenetelmiä. Yrityksessä oltiin tutkittu väitelausekkeisiin 
pohjautuvan muodollisen varmennusmenetelmän soveltuvuutta erilaisten piirimoduulien 
varmennukseen, minkä pohjalta voitiin olettaa sen sopivan myös ohjelmistorajapintojen 
varmentamiseen. Tässä työssä selvitettiin menetelmän todellinen soveltuvuus 
ohjelmistorajapintojen varmentamiseen käytännössä. 
Menetelmän käyttöä varten tuli luoda SystemVerilog-väitelausekkeita, joilla pystyttäisiin 
varmentamaan koko ohjelmistorajapinnan toiminnallisuus. Väitelausekkeiden luonti 
tehtiin kahdessa vaiheessa. Ensimmäisessä vaiheessa tavoitteena oli saada luotua 
väitelausekkeet, jotka pystyivät varmentamaan ohjelmistorajapinnan toiminnallisuuden. 
Tässä onnistuttiin hyödyntämällä sekä itse luotuja, että muodollisen varmennustyökalun 
tuottamia väitelausekkeita. Tässä vaiheessa ei kuitenkaan saavutettu tarpeeksi laajaa 
kattavuutta ohjelmistorajapinnan koko toiminnallisuudesta ja koodista, joten 
väitelausekkeita tuli parantaa. 
Vaiheessa kaksi kohennettiin vaiheen yksi väitelausekkeita tuottamaan parempi 
kattavuus. Lisäksi pyrittiin saamaan aikaiseksi mahdollisimman yhtenäisen rakenteen 
omaavia väitelausekkeita helpottamaan assertioiden luomiseen käytettävän 
komentosarjan kehittämistä tulevaisuudessa. Tätä tavoiteltiin yhdistämällä muodollisen 
varmennustyökalun tuottamia sekä itse luotuja väitelausekkeita. Tässä vaiheessa 
onnistuttiin parantamaan väitelausekkeita kattamaan kaikki oleellinen toiminnallisuus 
ohjelmistorajapinnoista, mutta väitelausekkeiden lopullisesta rakenteesta ei saatu niin 
yhtenäistä, kuin toivottiin. 
Työssä saatiin luotua uusi menetelmä ohjelmistorajapintojen varmennukseen. Kehitetty 
menetelmä ei yksinään pysty vielä korvaamaan käytössä olevia simulointeihin 
pohjautuvia menetelmiä, koska väitelausekkeiden luomista ei ole automatisoitu. 
Menetelmää suositeltiin kuitenkin käytettäväksi tukevana tapana ohjelmistorajapintojen 
varmennuksessa. 
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ABSTRACT 
SANTERI MÄKI-ÄIJÖ: Assertion-based Formal Verification of a SoC Module 
Software Interface 
Tampere University of Technology 
Master of Science Thesis, 48 pages, 6 Appendix pages 
August 2018 
Master’s Degree Programme in Electrical Engineering 
Major: Embedded Systems 
Examiner: Professor Timo D. Hämäläinen 
 
Keywords: System on a chip, assertion, verification, formal, RTL, SystemVerilog, 
SVA, software interface, coverage 
The goal of this thesis was to develop a new assertion-based formal verification method 
to verify SoC module SW interfaces used at Nokia Mobile Networks SoC R&D. Cur-
rently used simulation-based methods had been found to be ineffective in finding all bugs 
in SW interfaces. Therefore, a new method was needed to replace or support the current 
one. Previous studies had been made about the assertion-based formal verification method 
on different kinds of designs. The results implied that there is also potential to apply the 
method for SW interface verification. In this thesis, the suitability of the method for this 
task was examined in practice. 
To use the method, SystemVerilog assertions verifying the whole functionality of the SW 
interface had to be created first. The creation of assertions was carried out in two phases. 
In the first phase, the goal was to create assertions that could verify the SW interface 
functionality. The goal was achieved by utilizing the assertions created manually and by 
a formal verification tool. However, the coverage of SW interface functionality and code 
achieved with the assertions was not good enough. Thus, the assertions had to be im-
proved. 
In the second phase, phase 1 assertions were enhanced to produce better coverage. In 
addition, the assertions should also be created with as uniform structure as possible to 
ease assertion generator script development in the future. To achieve these targets, the 
manually created assertions were integrated into the assertions created by the formal ver-
ification tool. By doing this, the whole relevant functionality of SW interfaces was cov-
ered. However, the structure of the assertions was not as uniform as was desired. 
In this thesis, a new verification method for SoC module SW interface was produced. The 
developed method at its current state cannot replace the simulation-based methods, how-
ever, because the assertions are not generated automatically. Nevertheless, the method 
was suggested to be considered as an additional way to verify SW interfaces. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
System on a chip (SoC) is an electronic system built on a single semiconductor chip. A 
SoC includes all required circuitry and components of a system. In addition to the required 
hardware (HW), a SoC often includes a processor capable of running software (SW) ap-
plications. This SW controls the SoC components and modules to perform desired ac-
tions. To enable these SW accesses to a module, it must contain memory elements, like 
registers. These memory elements can be accessed by a SW program running on a pro-
cessor to monitor and configure how the module functions. A collection of these memory 
elements can be built into its own entity as a part of the SoC module, the SW interface of 
the module.  
Verification is a process done before manufacturing a design to ensure that the design 
will function as specified. Verification is an important part of SoC development because 
fixing design errors and bugs is much more expensive and difficult after the chip has been 
manufactured. Therefore, verification takes a major part of the total time used in SoC 
development, even up to 80% [1]. New and improved verification methods are constantly 
developed to make the verification process more effective and faster. 
This thesis was produced in the SoC organization of Nokia in Tampere. The specific goal 
was to develop a new way to verify SoC module SW interfaces used in the company. 
Previously, there had been bugs that had gone unnoticed by the simulation-based verifi-
cation methods used for SW interface verification, which caused errors later in the devel-
opment process. Therefore, the current verification methods were not enough. A different 
kind of approach was required either to support or replace the current methods to ensure 
the correct description of the SW interfaces.  
Studies on assertion-based formal verification method usage on several types of designs 
had been made in the company with promising results [2]. It was also seen that formal 
verification (FV) had potential to work well for a design like the SW interface. Based on 
this knowledge, it was decided that an assertion-based FV method should be developed. 
A FV tool, which was already in use at the company, was utilized in the verification 
process. However, the assertions to be used as the model of correct design functionality 
had not been created for SW interfaces.  The main goal of this thesis was to create the 
assertions and use them for the SW interface functional verification. The functionality 
and the design code of the SW interfaces should have been covered completely with the 
assertions. The assertions should also have had a structure that could allow them later to 
be generated with a script to automate the verification process. The script development is 
out of the scope of this thesis.  
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As the capability of assertion-based FV for SW interface was not known throughout, it 
was not sure that the developed method could actually achieve the set goals. Various 
reports provided by the FV tool would be used to analyze the functionality and code cov-
erage of the design with the assertions. Both coverages should be 100%. In addition, in-
formation about the time consumed in the verification process and how simple the devel-
oped assertion-based FV platform is to use would be gathered. The results would be ana-
lyzed to see, if the developed platform could achieve these goals and how it compares 
with the currently used simulation-based methods. Based on the results, suggestions could 
be made, if and on what scale the platform could be utilized in SW interface verification. 
The structure of this thesis is the following. Chapter 2 explains the assertion-based FV 
method and its key concepts. Chapter 3 presents the tools and methods used in this thesis. 
In chapter 4, the SW interface structure and its creation flow are described. The assertions 
were created in two phases. The first phase was about creating and using assertions for 
SW interface verification. Assertions, the used FV flow and the results of the first phase 
are presented in Chapter 5. In the second phase, phase 1 assertions were improved to have 
more uniform structure and provide better coverage. The enhanced assertions are then 
described in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 collects all the verification results of both phases in-
cluding their analysis. Finally, the conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter 8. 
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2. ASSERTION-BASED FORMAL METHODS OF 
RTL VERIFICATION 
Verification in digital hardware design process is about checking that a developed design 
matches its specifications or its model from a different abstraction level. It is done in 
parallel with the actual hardware design process before manufacturing the design. In prac-
tice, this means modeling the design and verifying it with various verification tools and 
methods.  
There are multiple types of verification that are used when verifying a design. Timing 
verification, for example, ensures that the design meets its timing requirements. Power 
analysis is done to ensure that power requirements are met. To determine that the design 
will function as it is specified to function, functional verification is performed. These and 
other verification types require that the design has proper specifications. [3] 
The modeling of the design can be performed on different abstraction levels. A higher 
abstraction level model is a less detailed description of a design compared to a lower level 
one. For example, a gate level model would include every logic gate, their connections 
and delays of the design whereas a higher register-transfer level (RTL) model considers 
the logic elements built from these logic gates and their connections in relation to the 
design clock cycle [4]. It is simpler to work on a higher abstraction level as there are 
fewer details to be considered. However, precision is lost when moving to a higher ab-
straction level, which could let some design flaws go unnoticed, if verification was done 
only on higher level. Timing issues, for instance, could be hidden in RTL model as there 
are no gate delays included. The functionality of a design is often described on RTL, 
therefore functional verification is feasible to be done on that level. It is the verification 
team’s task to ensure that enough verification is done on low enough abstraction levels to 
find out all possible flaws.  
A traditional and the most popular way to perform digital design verification is simula-
tion. In simulation, different input stimuli combinations are driven to a design model. The 
model is monitored to see what it does with different inputs. The inputs can be pseudo-
randomly generated, but even then, it is up to the designer to come up with all interesting 
input combinations. If all possible input combinations were tested exhaustively, time con-
sumed during verification rapidly increases with the design size and complexity. [1, 5] 
Formal verification is based on mathematically proving the correctness of a design. It 
computes what will happen in the design with all allowed input values instead of requiring 
them to be individually driven into the design and analyzing what happens as in simula-
tion. FV covers all design states and functionality when properly implemented. In asser-
tion-based FV, assertions are used to describe the design intent. The assertions are 
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checked with a FV tool whether they hold or not for the design under verification (DUV). 
FV performs best for relatively small designs as the larger the design is the larger its 
number of possible states, which quickly results in a major increase in time consumed 
during checking. [1, 5] 
In this thesis, functional verification was performed with an assertion-based formal veri-
fication method on the RTL descriptions of SoC module SW interfaces. This chapter ex-
plains the key concepts of this kind of verification process. 
2.1 Hardware description and verification languages 
Hardware description languages (HDL) provide a way to describe logic circuitry in a text 
form. HDLs use a higher abstraction level than the transistor level to describe design 
functionality making it easier to design new systems. A common abstraction level used 
in SoC development is RTL. [4] 
Two dominant HDLs, Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Lan-
guage (VHDL) and Verilog, can be used to describe digital systems on different abstrac-
tion levels. VHDL and Verilog include similar features and structures and are nearly 
equally popular in the digital design industry. They both also provide an ability to create 
test benches to verify digital systems through simulations. VHDL was used for the devel-
opment of SW interfaces discussed in this thesis.[4] 
SystemVerilog (SV) is a unified hardware design, specification and verification language 
[6]. It is basically Verilog but with multiple extensions added to it. These extensions have 
created sublanguages under SV for different purposes in digital design. There is an Ob-
ject-Oriented sublanguage used for verification, e.g., by Universal Verification Method-
ology (UVM) and a separate language for analyzing functional coverage. SystemVerilog 
Assertions (SVA) language is used to define assertions for verification. SVA was the 
language used for assertions created in this thesis. [7] 
2.2 Constraints in formal verification 
Formal verification analyzes that the design is functioning as it should with all possible 
input values. However, if the allowed input values of the DUV are not defined, the FV 
tool will analyze all values and combinations even though some of them can never occur 
in the design. To avoid this, constraints on the inputs can be defined. These constraints 
prevent the FV tool from computing false, unnecessary or unwanted input values and their 
combinations. This reduces verification runtime and ensures that valid inputs are used in 
design verification. It also allows creating specific situations or scenarios in the design to 
be verified. One method to implement constraints is defining SystemVerilog assumptions, 
which is explained in section 2.3.2. [7-9] 
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Constraints can cause problems in verification, if not properly defined. Implementing too 
few constraints on the inputs allows the FV tool to use invalid values while computing. 
This situation is called under-constraining. Conversely, there can also be too many con-
straints on the inputs. Over-constraining prevents some valid input values from being 
analyzed. This in its turn causes certain design behavior never being analyzed and can 
result in bugs not being found in the design. Constraints must therefore be carefully im-
plemented so that the design is completely and correctly analyzed in the FV tool.[7, 8, 
10] 
2.3 SystemVerilog assertions 
An assertion is a positive statement of what the design should do based on design speci-
fication. An assertion written with SVA is a precise and clear description of the design 
intent. If the assertion is false, it indicates an error in the design. SVA provides a faster 
and more understandable way to describe design intent than traditional HDLs like Veri-
log. Due to their unambiguous nature, SVA assertions fit well into FV. While the FV tool 
analyzes the design with possible inputs, the assertions are constantly checked whether 
they are true or not and, thus, verify the design functionality. If assertions cover all design 
functionality and the FV tool can analyze the design with all possible inputs, a design can 
be completely verified.[7, 9] 
All assertions created in this thesis were SVA assertions. The following sections explain 
the structure and important features of SVA assertions.  
2.3.1 Immediate and concurrent assertions 
There are two main types of SVA assertions. Immediate assertions are non-temporal 
Boolean statements placed in procedural code. Immediate assertions resemble the condi-
tion of an “if” statement. They are executed like other procedural statements and are eval-
uated immediately when encountered in the code. They cannot consume simulation time. 
Immediate assertions can be edge or level sensitive to a clock or sampling signal. They 
do not include a property and are defined by the assert keyword only. Deferred immediate 
assertions are a special type of immediate assertions. These assertions evaluate their Bool-
ean expression after every variable in it has settled down and not immediately when the 
assertion is triggered. This reduces the chances of glitches happening in the assertion 
evaluation. [7, 9] 
The second main type of SVA assertions is the concurrent assertion. A concurrent asser-
tion differs from an immediate assertion by being temporal. This means that the asserted 
expression can contain time consuming elements. This allows building more complex 
expressions and sequences to be asserted. A concurrent assertion always has a property 
that contains the expressions and sequences. The name concurrent comes from the fact 
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that concurrent assertions are executed in parallel with the design logic. They can be de-
fined in always and initial procedures but also outside of any procedures. A concurrent 
assertion must have a clock edge defined to which it is sensitive. This is also called as the 
sampling edge on which the assertion evaluation starts. SVA concurrent assertions are 
very useful in FV as the FV tool can constantly check if the specified assertions hold for 
the DUV. In other words, concurrent assertions can describe design behavior in analyza-
ble form for the FV tools. Every assertion created in this thesis was a concurrent assertion. 
[7, 9] 
2.3.2 Concurrent assertion structure 
A concurrent assertion is based on a property that describes some part of the design func-
tionality. This functionality is expressed with Boolean expressions, e.g., that a certain 
signal in the design always has a value ‘1’. Boolean expressions can be combined to form 
sequences. In a sequence, the Boolean expressions are listed in linear order with respect 
to increasing time. A sequence is true, if all the expressions it consists are true on their 
defined clock ticks. Sequences can describe more advanced functionality than single 
Boolean expressions, like a register write or a bus handshake operation. A property may 
contain multiple sequences.[7, 9] 
A property can be defined together with the assertion or on its own. If the property is 
defined separately, it allows the same property to be reused. A property can be included 
in either an assertion, cover or assume statement. If the property is used in assert state-
ment, an assertion is created. If the property is part of a cover statement, it allows tracking 
of functional coverage of the design. If the cover statement is never true, it means that the 
functionality it describes never occurs in the design. Assume statements are used to con-
straint design behavior. They can, e.g., force certain signal to be high for two clock cycles 
whenever another signal has been high.  In FV, assume statements are used to limit the 
input values and their combinations the FV tool uses when verifying a design. [7, 9] 
Figure 1 presents the basic structure of a concurrent SVA language assertion. The mean-
ing of concurrent assertion and the implication and $sampled seen in the figure, are ex-
plained in following sections. An assertion can have a label, which is basically its name, 
but it is not necessary. If no label is given, the tool used for assertion checking will give 
it a tool specific name. Here, the property is defined with the assertion statement, thus, 
creating an assertion. The assertion is evaluated on every positive edge of the clock, 
whenever the reset signal is low. When the assertion is evaluated, the Boolean expres-
sion(s) and sequence(s) are checked whether they are true or not. These expressions and 
sequences form the antecedent and the consequent of the assertion. The antecedent is 
checked first whether it is true or not. If it is true, the consequent is checked. If it is not 
true, the assertion is not evaluated. The assertion is true, or in other words holds, if the 
consequent is true after the antecedent triggered. Otherwise, the assertion is said to “fire” 
when it is false and an optional error message is displayed. 
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Figure 1: Concurrent assertion structure. [11] 
Assertion can include multiple sequences that for multiple antecedent – consequent pairs. 
Assertions can also be sensitive to multiple clocks and their different edges and levels. 
Therefore, it is possible to create very complex assertions that can verify complex design 
functionality. However, it is advised that the assertions should be kept relatively simple 
and small. This improves the understandability of the assertions and their debugging. 
Complex design functionality should be verified by several smaller assertions. [7, 9] 
2.3.3 Implication 
Implication is a way to create sequential properties from sequences. The idea is that there 
is a precondition, an antecedent, and something that is evaluated after the precondition 
triggers, a consequent. This kind of structure was already seen in Figure 1. Between the 
antecedent and the consequent, is the implication construct.  [7, 9] 
There are two types of implication used in assertions. Overlapping implication is denoted 
with |->. In overlapping implication, the consequent checking is done right after the ante-
cedent is true, which basically means on the same clock tick. In nonoverlapping implica-
tion, the consequent is evaluated on the next clock tick after the antecedent was true. 
Nonoverlapping assertion is constructed with |=>. [7, 9] 
It is possible to include multiple implications in a single assertion property. The structure 
is always the same in that the left-hand side is the antecedent and the right-hand side is 
the consequent. Consequent of an implication can be the antecedent of another implica-
tion. The time when the consequent is checked can be modified by adding other time 
defining statements to the assertion. The consequent could for example be checked on the 
third clock tick after an overlapping implication’s antecedent is true by adding ##3 after 
the implication construct. Adding ##[1:2] after the implication construct would mean that 
the consequent is evaluated on the following two clock cycles. These time statements are 
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not directly part of the implication but allow more complex behavior to be described in 
the assertion with the implication. [7, 9] 
2.3.4 SystemVerilog system functions 
SV offers system functions and tasks that are usable in assertions and assertion control. 
These include bit vector functions that provide functions like $onehot to check that a 
certain bit vector only has a single bit high and $countones to count the number of bits 
that are high in the vector. Assertions can be controlled with certain tasks. $asserton and 
$assertoff enable or disable assertion checking. Separate assertions can be controlled with 
$assertcontrol and its different parameters. These control statements are not suitable for 
FV but are useful in simulations. [7] 
The most used system functions in this thesis were the sampled value functions. These 
functions evaluate an integer expression on defined sampling edges (clock edges). If the 
integer expression is sampled to have values defined by the function, the function returns 
true. $rose function for example checks when the least significant bit (LSB) of sampled 
value rises from 0 to 1 between two sampling edges. When this occurs, the function re-
turns true. The opposite situation of the LSB is evaluated with $fell function. To notice 
changes in the expression value being sampled, $changed function can be used. It con-
siders all bits of the expression from current and past sampling edges. $stable function 
returns true if the expression value did not change during two consecutive sampling 
edges. To get a certain sampled expression value either $sampled or $past function can 
be used. $sampled returns the expression value sampled on the current sampling edge. 
$past in its turn returns the expression value sampled on some previous sampling edge, 
which is given as a parameter of the function. These functions provide handy ways to 
build assertion properties and improve their readability.[7, 9] 
2.3.5 Witness and counterexample 
While verifying a design, the FV tool checks whether defined assertions hold or not. If 
the assertion is true at least once, a witness could be generated. A witness is a report by 
the FV tool about an input sequence that resulted in the assertion being true. The report 
is different depending on the FV tool but at least the numeric values of the input sequences 
are included. A waveform of signals related to the assertion could also be presented. If 
the assertion fails at least once, a counterexample is created. A counterexample is the 
opposite of a witness as it reports an input sequence that caused the assertion to fail. Sim-
ilar information as in witness is included in the counterexample. From these reports it is 
possible to analyze if the assertion is checking the intended behavior and, if the design 
does what it should. [7] 
It is possible that the assertion is never evaluated during a FV tool check. This could 
happen due to the input values being too strictly constrained or some assume statements 
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preventing the behavior described in the assertion from occurring. There could also be a 
design bug or the assertion could be poorly written. The FV tool could also not have 
checked deep enough into the design state space to see the asserted behavior. Whatever 
the reason, it is much harder to find out compared to a situation where a counterexample 
was available.[7] 
2.4 Formal verification tools 
FV tools are EDA-tools that can verify designs with formal verification methods. The 
methods perform either equivalence or property checking. In equivalence checking, two 
versions of a design are compared, e.g. RTL and gate-level descriptions. The other ver-
sion is already verified to be working correctly and another version is then compared to 
it. In property checking, correct design behavior is described with properties. These are 
then used to check if the actual design implements the same behavior. A good way to 
describe and check the properties is through assertions.  The assertions can be created 
manually by a designer or they could be generated by the FV tool if the tool has an appli-
cation for it. It is possible that a same FV tool includes both equivalence and property 
checking. [5] 
FV tools typically offer additional applications on top of the property and equivalence 
checking. They can have applications dedicated to different error type, like X-state, 
checking or certain design structure, like register, checking. X-state checking analyzes, 
e.g., if the design has undefined signal values often caused by multiple drivers driving 
different values to the same signal. Register checks can verify, e.g., if the registers are 
accessible and that they have correct reset values.  Different coverage calculation features 
are also common. FV tools might include assertion libraries or assertion generators for 
some standardized design parts like standard bus protocols.[12-14] 
An example way to use the FV tool is to first read the design into the FV tool. This is 
done by providing the design for the FV tool in a format it understands, e.g., in RTL or 
IP-XACT [15]. The tool then analyzes it and creates an internal model of the design. This 
model is created through methods such as compilation and elaboration. Also, either a 
reference model or assertions describing the design intent are needed for the actual veri-
fication. After all necessary information is loaded to the tool, it runs the selected type of 
checks and possible other features. After the run, the tool provides reports with verifica-
tion results, which can then be further analyzed by the designer. 
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3. TOOLS AND METHODS 
This chapter describes the tools and methods used in this thesis. Reasoning, why the as-
sertion-based FV was chosen, is explained. Also, the FV tool used for the verification is 
presented. However, the tools and flow used to create SW interfaces are described in 
section 4.2 due to them strongly being part of the SW interface description and partly a 
target of the verification. 
3.1 Why assertion-based formal verification? 
The goal of this thesis was to verify the functionality of a SoC module SW interface. 
Therefore, functional verification method was needed. Functional verification determines 
if the design matches its specifications or not [3]. FV is static functional verification, 
which means it is a feasible method for the task [16]. The size and complexity of a SW 
interface were considered not to be too great for achieving tolerable FV check runtimes. 
Due to this, FV was a valid option for SW interface verification.  
Proper and comprehensive input stimuli for the SW interface functionality would have 
been difficult to create. Also, a new set of input stimuli would have been required for 
every new SW interface. Simulations were therefore not a good enough solution for com-
plete SW interface verification. With FV, constraints are utilized to limit analyzed input 
sequences. The FV tool analyzes the design behavior with all input sequences not ruled 
out with the constraints. As long as the constraints are properly defined, this eliminates 
the need to create input stimuli, which further backed up choosing FV as the verification 
method. 
FV requires either a reference model or design to be compared with the DUV to see, if it 
is working as specified. The SW interface specifications clearly described the possible 
functionality a SW interface could have. The functionality also seemed to be feasible to 
be described as assertions. It was not certain that it would have been possible to create 
assertions for all functionality. However, previous knowledge and experiences ([2]) im-
plied that assertions would work well in this situation. In addition, assertions for part of 
the SW interface functionality, like for the bus between CPU and the SW interface, could 
have been generated with a capable FV tool. Due to these reasons, assertions were chosen 
to be the reference of the correct design functionality for FV. 
3.2 Onespin 
The FV tool used for verification in this thesis was Onespin 360 DV Verify [14]. It was 
already used in the company and had an appropriate set of features for SW interface ver-
ification. A brief introduction of the used features is given in this section. 
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The tool could perform assertion-based FV on digital designs. For this, the design files 
and optional files that contained the assertions are required. In this thesis, the design files 
were the design source code in VHDL and IP-XACT format description of the design in 
XML-file. The tool performed elaboration and compilation to produce a model of the 
design that it could then run FV checks on. During elaboration, the tool determines the 
design top level and forms the hierarchy of all other design elements inside it [17]. In 
compilation, the design elements are compiled [17]. Assertions were provided as a sepa-
rate SVA file.  The tool could generate assertions for checking certain bus protocols, in-
cluding the one used in the verified SW interfaces. This feature was utilized for the bus 
verification. The assertion file had to be bound to the design module instance created by 
the FV tool [16]. This way, the assertions could be checked by the tool on the correct 
design.  
After the actual assertion checking, the tool provided various reports to analyze the re-
sults. These reports were one of the key ways to confirm that a part of SW interface func-
tionality, and/or the assertion created to verify it, worked as was intended. The tool cre-
ated witnesses and counterexamples when possible. Both could be opened to see a wave-
form of related signals and their values few clock cycles before and after the assertion 
condition was fired. In addition, the assertion and design source code could be viewed. 
The tool noted in the source codes what values the parameters had and which line was 
active at a certain clock cycle. If no witness or counterexample could be created, the tool 
provided information about why they could not be created. A detailed explanation how 
these features were used in SW interface verification is given section 5.2. Figure 2 shows 
a snapshot of a witness report waveform view for one assertion, which checks that register 
reg_basicreg_s value changes are immediately visible in its output port basic_reg_out. 
 
Figure 2: Witness waveform view. 
Another feature used to analyze completeness of assertions and the design verification 
was a formal code coverage feature called Quantify. It analyzes the design code state-
ments and branches to see if they are observed by assertions currently used under current 
constraints. Observed means that the statement or branch is covered by at least one asser-
tion. The tool also analyzed if the code statement or branch was reached in the assertion 
check ran by the tool. For the statement or branch to be fully covered, it had to be both 
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reached and observed. This feature was used after some assertions were created and al-
ready checked in the tool to confirm that the assertion checked everything it was supposed 
to. [10] 
An example of Quantify report overview is presented in Figure 3. The report shows the 
design and assertion files used in the assertion check, percentages of how well the design 
code is covered and information about each assertion included in the check.  
 
Figure 3: Quantify report overview. 
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4. SOFTWARE INTERFACE OF A SOC MODULE 
This chapter describes the purpose of the SW interface in a SoC module and how it is 
created. In addition, a detailed description of the interface’s register functionality, the 
importance of the interface for SoC modules and how its functionality is currently verified 
are presented. 
The SW interface of a SoC module is a collection of physical registers contained in a 
separate block on the chip. The SW interface can be accessed by software running on a 
central processing unit (CPU) through a bus with read and write operations. Figure 4 is a 
simplified illustration of SW interface structure with all the key elements shown. [18] 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of a SW interface. 
On the left in the figure is the bus interface through which the CPU connects to the SW 
interface. The registers in the SW interface can be read and written through this bus in-
terface. Decoding/muxing element takes care of data reading from or written to the correct 
register. The registers can have different types. RegC, for instance, in the figure is a write-
only register since its value can only be written through the bus interface. Register RegB 
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field ‘0’ is a read-only type because it can only be read by the bus. Different register types 
are explained in section 4.3.1.[18] 
The SW interface can contain a special functionality to access and use the registers inde-
pendently from the bus interface. These register functionalities are defined as functions, 
which are shown on the right side of the Figure 4. The functions can, for example, create 
additional I/O ports that allow other HW modules to be connected to the SW interface or 
make a register value depend on the value of other register. The functions will be ex-
plained in detail in section 4.3.2. [18] 
In addition, it is possible to define memory regions in the interface mapped to the register 
address space. Each memory region has its own RAM input and output ports that are 
connected to a RAM block located elsewhere in the SoC. [18] 
4.1 SW interface functions 
The SW interface has a couple of key functions in a SoC module. The interface can be 
used to control certain parts of a SoC module as its functionality is possible to be tied to 
the register contents. Part of the module, for example, could be enabled or disabled de-
pending on a certain register value in the interface. Also, parameters for the module can 
be given through the register. [18] 
Another function for the SW interface is that it can provide status information of the SoC 
module for SW. HW can be built to modify certain register content e.g. to describe dif-
ferent errors having occurred in the module. This kind of status information from the 
module is vital for SW, e.g., to act to solve an occurred error. [18] 
The third important application for the SW interface is the handling of interrupts gener-
ated by the SoC module. SW interface registers can be connected to HW so that they 
allow the SW to notice, handle and clear interrupts generated by the HW. SW can read 
interrupt status register(s) to get information, which interrupt is active, and then do re-
quired operations to handle the interrupt. After the interrupt is handled, SW can clear the 
active status of the interrupt by writing to a certain register. [18] 
The described SW interface functions are the most common use cases. However, it is 
possible to use a SW interface for a wide range of specialized tasks that do not belong to 
the presented use cases. A SW interface can include many registers that have numerous 
different use cases. This can make an interface a complex and large block. However, the 
structure of SW interfaces is always the same. For this reason, it has been possible to 
automate the creation process to produce SW interfaces without writing any RTL code. 
[18] 
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4.2 Automated creation process of a SW interface 
Before any design is created, a detailed specification of the requirements for the product 
should be made. For a SW interface, the number of registers, their size and type of the 
registers must be defined. The bus protocol used to access the SW interface must be de-
cided. The possible constraints for power consumption and resource usage must be met 
by the interface. The specification stage is important because changes to the specifications 
made after the SW interface has already been created also require changes to the interface. 
This could mean complete recreation of the interface.  
There exists a special flow for creating the SW interfaces. The flow consists of three steps, 
which are explained next. [18] 
4.2.1 Step 1: Defining a SW interface 
After the specifications have been agreed on, the creation flow starts with defining the 
interface registers in an MS Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet contains separate sheets 
with different information. A cover sheet is used to document changes made to the spread-
sheet. Every new version of the spreadsheet will have its own version number, date it was 
made, name of the person who made the changes and a brief description of what was 
done. Then, another sheet has all additional parameters to be included as VHDL generics 
in the interface, if those are needed. The most important sheet is the one where every 
register of an interface is defined. An example definition of a register is shown in Table 
1. [18] 
Table 1: SW interface register definition in MS Excel 
group address register field start stop dim rw default 
hdl_
path description 
reg_fu
nction_
tests                    
default                     
  0x04 RegA       1         
      Bits 31 0   RW 0x0   
[Input Func-
tion: PORT 
Basic_reg_in] 
[Output Func-
tion: PORT 
Basic_reg_out] 
 
Table 1 shows the definition of a 32-bit register named RegA that has a single register 
field called Bits. Its direct address is 0x04, which is used by the SW to access this register 
through the bus. The register is part of an interface called reg_function_tests and default 
register group. Only one copy of this register is created as its dimension is 1, which is 
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defined in the dim field. If the dimension is bigger than 1, multiple instances of the reg-
ister are created with an indexing number added to their name and with consecutive ad-
dresses. The register type is defined in the rw field and its default value in the default 
field. For the register in the figure, the type is read-write (RW) and default value is 0. 
HDL_path for a register is not defined in the spreadsheet but later in the flow. The 
HDL_path is the RTL description path from top level all the way down to the register, 
which can be used in verification to directly access the register. The description field is 
for describing the register and for defining functions for the register. These functions de-
fine additional functionality for the register and are explained in detail in section 4.3.2. 
For the register in Table 1, an output function PORT Basic_reg_out is defined, which 
means that the register will have its own output port named Basic_reg_out in the inter-
face. A register definition can also have a separate field for comments about the register. 
[18] 
A register can include multiple fields with different type, width and function but there are 
some constraints for their values. The maximum register width is the width of the CPU 
bus as it must be possible to write the whole register with a single write operation. The 
number of fields a register can have is the width of the register since a single field must 
be at least 1-bit wide. Each field of a register can have only one type but separate fields 
inside a register can have different types. These types are explained in section 4.3.1. [18] 
It is not required that all registers of a SW interface must be defined in the spreadsheet. 
Although if a register is not defined in the spreadsheet, it must be manually added to the 
files created by this SW interface generation flow. 
4.2.2 Step 2: Creating IP-XACT representation of a SW interface 
The step following the MS Excel spreadsheet definition is to generate IP-XACT standard 
form representation of the spreadsheet content in an XML-file. This is done because the 
IP-XACT format file is suitable input for many EDA-tools, including the tools used in 
this creation flow. [15, 19] 
In addition, information of the bus protocol is added in this stage to the XML-file. There 
are several choices for the bus protocol but AXI4Lite is the most common selection [20].  
An EDA-tool provided by Magillem is used for this step in the creation flow but any other 
tool with the same features could be used. Lastly, an in-house script for the tool is used 
to produce a text file description of the just created XML-file, which helps in the final 
step. [18] 
4.2.3 Step 3: Generation of RTL description of a SW interface 
The final step in the creation flow is to generate an RTL description of the SW interface 
in VHDL format. An in-house register generator script is used to generate the actual RTL 
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code from a text file created in the previous step. The script parses the design information 
from the text file and produces a VHDL file as a result. When the VHDL file is ready, the 
creation process is finished and the SW interface is ready for synthesis.[18] 
4.3 Register functionality in a SW interface 
As seen in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the registers in the SW interface block are not just for 
storing data that can be read and written. From the SW point of view this could be the 
case as it can only read or write different registers in the interface through the bus. How-
ever, additional functionality can be added to the interface. This functionality is declared 
together with the register type and function definitions in the register definition table.[18] 
4.3.1 Register types 
All registers in the interface all have a type. The type defines if the register is writeable, 
readable, clears its bits when written or read, and so on. The type is defined for every 
register field individually, so a register can have fields of different type. All possible reg-
ister types are shown with a brief description in Table 2. [18] 
Table 2: SW interface register types 
Register type Description 
RW read-write 
RO read only 
RC read to clear all  
RS read to set all 
WO write only 
WC write to clear all 
WS write to set all 
WRC normal write, read to clear all 
WRS normal write, read to set all 
W1C write 1 to clear all 
W1S write 1 to set all 
W1 write once 
WO1 write only (once) 
WOC write only, clear all 
WOS write only, set all 
WSRC write sets and read clears all 
WCRS write clears and read sets all 
W1CRS write 1 clears, read sets all 
W1SRC write 1 sets, read clears all 
W0CRS write 0 clears, read sets all 
W0SRC write 0 sets, read clears all 
W1T write 1 to toggle 
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Register type Description 
W0T write 0 to toggle 
 
Different register types are used for different purposes. A RW register is flexible and has 
the most use cases of the register types as it is compatible with almost all functions a 
register can have. Other register types are used when the register has a specialized pur-
pose, e.g., a RO type could be defined when the register contains a constant parameter 
that should therefore never be rewritten or if the register value can only be modified by 
HW. [18] 
4.3.2 Register functions 
There are three main function types of which a register can have functions defined. All 
functions are defined by adding [<function_type> Function: <function>] to the descrip-
tion field of the register. [18] 
Input functions describe functionality that control what is written into a register. PORT 
-function is used to create an input port for the register, which can be used to drive data 
to the register. An example definition is shown in Table 3. [18] 
Table 3: Input function definition 
address register field start stop dim rw default hdl_path description 
                   
0x04 BasicReg       1         
    Bits 31 0   RW 0x0   
[Input Function: PORT 
Basic_reg_in] 
 
It is optional to provide a name for the input port. A name derived from the register name 
will be created if no name is defined in the function declaration. The input port function 
can be combined with other functions.[18] 
EDGE and LEVEL input functions are used set or clear all register bits on certain edge or 
level of the input port. The LEVEL functions may also add an enable signal that needs to 
be either high or low for the input port value to be written into a register. This enable can 
be either an additional input port or a different register field. These functions are used, 
e.g., for interrupt status registers as they can capture interrupt events coming from the 
module through the input port. An example declaration of a register with LEVEL function 
is shown in Table 4. This register will update its value from the input port REG1_in when 
ENABLE_REG field REG1_en has the value ‘1’.[18] 
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Table 4: Level function definition 
address register field start stop dim rw default hdl_path description 
                   
0x00 REG1       1         
    Bits 15 0   RW 0x0   
[Input Function: LEVEL1 
ENABLE_REG.REG1_en; 
PORT REG1_in] 
Other input functions include functions that compute a register value with an OR, AND 
or XOR operation of two registers. The rest of the input functions are used for adding 
delay or synchronizing stages to the input.[18] 
Output functions define how the register (field) value is used. With PORT function, a 
dedicated output port can be created for the register. This function can be defined like the 
input PORT function. Only the function type must be defined as Output. A name for the 
port can be defined but it is not mandatory. A name derived from the register will be used 
if no name is specified. Like for the input functions, the PORT function is usable with 
other output functions. [18] 
A DELAY function must be combined with PORT function. DELAY function adds a spec-
ified delay after which the register value is visible in the defined output port. DELAY 
function does not affect the CPU bus. An example definition of a register with output 
delay is presented in Table 5. The delay for this register’s output is two clock cycles.[18] 
Table 5: Output function example 
address register field start stop dim rw default hdl_path description 
                    
0x50 DelayReg       1         
    Bits 3 0   RW 0x3   
[Output Function: PORT 
DelayReg_out;  
DELAY=2] 
 
Other output functions include OP functions that add a 1-bit output signal or port to the 
register. This signal or port holds the result of a Boolean operation performed on the 
register bits. Clock synchronization functions are used to synchronize the register output 
to a clock signal that is not the clock used by the SW interface. Finally, there are STROBE 
and PULSE functions to produce 1-bit signals that trigger when the register value changes 
or a new value is written to the register.[18] 
The third main function category is the internal functions. Internal functions define func-
tionality for a register field inside the SW interface. The most common internal function 
is the ID function. ID function is used to create a register that holds identity information 
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of the SW interface block that contains the register. The ID register holds multiple de-
scription lines of information that can be read with consecutive read operations from the 
register. An example ID register definition is shown in Table 6.[18] 
Table 6: Internal function example 
address 
regist
er field start stop dim rw default 
hdl_ 
path description 
                   
0x0 Id                 1       Identification register 
    ID 31 0   RW 32'h55 
  
[Internal Function: ID] 
Value 0 : 32'h55555 
Synchronization word  
Value 1 : 32'h000239 
Component code                        
Value 2 : IDVersion-
Number_C              
Value 3 : 32'h0 Build 
number                          
Value 4 : MySize_C 
Module parameter #1  
 
Other internal functions include BUS_ERROR that counts illegal bus accesses to an inter-
face and WIRE that creates a read-only register without any flip-flops. CONSTANT func-
tion defines that a register contains a constant value. COMBO_* functions indicate a 
multi-address register, which can be accessed through several addresses but there is only 
one physical register implemented. The ‘*’ in the COMBO function can be either STA-
TUS, SET, CLEAR or TOGGLE.[18] 
There are few function types that do not fit clearly into one of the three main function 
categories. These are the miscellaneous functions. SET and CLEAR functions are used 
to allow register content to be set or cleared when a defined condition is valid. The con-
dition is that either a port, a register field or a certain bit in a register field has a certain 
value. [18] 
ENABLE function defines an additional enable condition for register writing. The enable 
condition must be true for the CPU to be able to write a new value to the register. The 
condition can have ports and register fields compared to certain values or other ports and 
register fields. It is also possible to include AND, OR and NOT expressions to the condi-
tions. However, it is not possible to include both port names and register fields in the 
same condition expression. Table 7 shows an example definition of SET and ENABLE 
functions that both have a similar condition where a port value needs to be a certain value, 
here ‘1’.[18] 
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Table 7: SET and ENABLE function example 
address register field start stop dim rw default 
hdl_
path description 
                    
0x100 REG       1         
    high 31 16   RW 0x0   
[Set Function: PORT  
SetPort = '1'] 
    low 15 0   RW 0x123   
[Enable Function: PORT 
EnablePort = '1'] 
 
The last miscellaneous function is the memory function, which is used to implement reg-
ister address space mapped memories. These memories are accessible by CPU through 
the SW interface bus with the same write and read operations as normal registers. The 
memory itself is located outside of the SW interface and is connected to the interface 
through its input and output ports that are mapped to the SW interface registers.[18] 
In total, there are about 30 different functions that can further be defined with different 
conditions and combined with each other. The number of functions a single register can 
have is not limited. The designers can define as many of them as they like for a register. 
However, not all functions work together and will cause errors. Which functions may be 
used together is up to the designer to know. The register type must also be suitable for the 
functions defined to work. For example, a register with CONSTANT function should not 
have a type that allows the register content to be changed, like RW that allows bus write 
operations.[18] 
4.4 Verification and usage of the SW interface  
The registers in SW interfaces are partly verified during the SoC verification process. 
Simulations that make read and write operations with random data are made to check that 
the register is accessible. However, the special functionality defined with register func-
tions is left untouched as they are difficult and time-consuming to verify. The tools and 
scripts used to create the SW interface do verify that the defined interface has registers 
with correct widths, addresses and valid port, register and register field names in the func-
tion description [18]. These do not check that the generated VHDL code implements the 
described function as it should be implemented.  
Step 2 of the creation flow presented in section 4.2.2 is verified by the EDA-tool provider. 
It is the in-house register generator script, which creates the RTL implementation that is 
not fully verified. Test runs have been made with the creation flow to see that it is working 
for the most common register types and functions. However, not all possible register def-
initions have been verified. This means that it cannot be said that a SW interface created 
with the flow is 100% correct. 
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SW interfaces created with the described flow are used widely in SoC projects in the 
company. There have been cases where a created interface has had errors and the causes 
had been hard to find. A FV tool that supported assertion-based verification was already 
in use in the company. If assertions were created for all functionality, implementation of 
a SW interface could be verified. Efforts made to create the assertions are described in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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5. PHASE 1: CREATING ASSERTIONS TO VER-
IFY SW INTERFACE FUNCTIONALITY 
This chapter presents the first phase of the thesis work. At the end of this phase, assertions 
for all SW interface functionality added with the register functions should have been cre-
ated. During assertion development, possible bugs found in the SW interface generator 
would be reported. Also, it would be known how well the assertions covered SW interface 
functionality and if the assertion-based FV platform being developed is suitable for the 
task as assumed. 
5.1 Verification of register types 
The formal verification tool automatically created basic read and write operation Sys-
temVerilog assertions for the used AXI4Lite bus protocol [14]. These assertions were 
used to check if the register types are generated as mentioned in the register generator 
specification [18]. It was also analyzed how the different register types of the SW inter-
face are covered by automatically created assertions. The register types were verified first 
to make sure that they function correctly before starting to create assertions for the register 
functions. 
The design under verification (DUV) was a SW interface, which included registers with 
a single field, generated with the creation flow described in Chapter 4. Each register had 
a different register type used in their field. This kind of approach was chosen to clearly 
separate the checking of a single register type from the others. All possible register types 
were included in the DUV. 
Some problems were encountered when running assertion checks on the DUV. At first, 
all register read and write assertions failed. Examining the FV tool’s counterexample re-
port revealed that the read and write address signals of the AXI4Lite bus were not com-
pletely constrained to function as they did in the interface. The address signals were, by 
default, 32-bits in the formal tool but the interface only used 12-bits. In addition, register 
addresses in the interface were defined with four bytes offset from each other starting 
from 0. This meant that the lowest two bits of the address signals were always 0. Neither 
of these characteristics of the interface were told to the formal tool through constraints, 
which allowed the tool to wiggle bits that it should not and cause the assertions to fail. 
The importance of restricting the input values to possible input values of the design was 
noticed through these problems. Otherwise, assertions might fail even though the design 
is working as it was intended. From this point on, special care was used to ensure that 
under-constraining would not cause errors in verification.  
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Table 8 presents the results of register type verification with assertions. It shows if the 
assertions created for the register held and if the created VHDL implementation of the 
register matched with register specifications. It is also shown if a witness or counterex-
ample could be created for the assertion. The register types the interface can have are 
read-write (RW), read-only (RO), read-clear (RC), read-set (RS), their write operation 
counterparts and different combinations of them. 
Table 8 : Register type verification results 
Register 
type 
AXI4Lite checks hold VHDL matches type Witness/counterex 
RW yes yes yes 
RO yes yes yes 
RC no   yes yes 
RS no yes yes 
WO yes yes yes 
WC yes yes yes 
WS yes yes yes 
WRC no yes yes 
WRS no yes yes 
W1C yes yes yes 
W1S yes yes yes 
W1 yes yes yes 
WO1 yes yes yes 
WOC yes yes yes 
WOS yes yes yes 
WSRC no yes yes 
WCRS no yes yes 
W1CRS no yes yes 
W1SRC no yes yes 
W0CRS no yes yes 
W0SRC yes no yes 
W1T yes yes yes 
W0T yes yes yes 
 
Few register types did not get correct VHDL implementation generated by the generation 
script. Write-clear and write-only clear types (WC, WOC, WO1) caused errors in the 
script and blocked the generation of the whole interface. W0SRC -type caused no errors 
in the script but it did not get correct VHDL implementation either. It was created as a 
basic RW-type register. Based on these findings, the script was fixed to correctly support 
and implement these register types. 
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The assertions that did not hold had either RC or RS functionality. They failed because 
the assertions considered registers being able to only change their value through bus write 
operations. RC and RS type registers modify the register content when read, which causes 
the written and read values not to match and the assertion to fail. However, the correct 
functioning of the register types was possible to be fully verified from counterexample 
report waveforms and by looking at the generated RTL implementation.  
Figure 5 shows the waveform view of counterexample report created for a RC type reg-
ister. The assertion fails due to the read register value (RDATA) not matching the previ-
ously written value (READCLEARTEST_B0). This does mean that the register content 
is cleared without a bus write operation, which implies that the register is working as it 
should. It was confirmed by viewing the RTL implementation that the register functions 
correctly. 
 
Figure 5: Read-clear register counterexample. 
Even though automatically generated assertions did not hold for all register types, the 
types could be verified to be working as intended by examining the witness and counter-
example reports and the VHDL implementation of the SW interface. Few bugs were 
found and fixed in the interface generator script and it was now functioning correctly for 
the register types. However, since the FV tool automatically created assertions for the 
register did not work for all types, they could not be used as such to achieve 100% func-
tional coverage. Improvements or completely new assertions would be required to fully 
cover the bus read and write operations. This problem was decided to be solved later, 
when assertions for the register functions were created. 
5.2 Verification of register functions 
This section explains how an assertion for a SW interface function was created and how 
both the assertion and the function were verified to be correctly implemented. 
5.2.1 Creating an assertion 
The first step in assertion creation was to understand the specification of the function the 
assertion was going to verify. Without fully knowing what the functions should do, a 
proper assertion for it could not be created. If the specification was misunderstood, time 
would be wasted on debugging an incorrectly designed assertion. Also, it might be pos-
sible for a wrongly implemented function to get through verification, if it was not noticed 
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that the assertion did not verify it correctly. This step was executed carefully to prevent 
these cases from occurring. 
The next step was to generate a SW interface with registers that have the functions to be 
verified. Similar structure as with the register types, one function per one register (field), 
was used in the interface. Two to three new registers with new functions to verify were 
added at the same time. Assertions for these were then created and used to verify the 
registers before adding new ones. This approach was used during the whole phase 1. 
After the preliminary steps were done, the assertions could be created. The assertions 
were created with SVA language. A separate file for the assertions was used for the man-
ually created assertions to clearly separate them from the assertions generated by the for-
mal tool. An assertion was designed to check that a register, I/O port or an internal signal 
of the SW interface changed its value or displayed a correct value as defined by the func-
tion. Real values of the registers, ports and signals were considered in the assertions. The 
values and from what point of time they were considered varied greatly in the assertions.  
Assertions were created individually. One assertion had to be complete before starting to 
create a new one. An assertion was complete when it could verify the functionality de-
fined with a register function it should verify. This was ensured with verification tasks as 
described in section 5.2.2.  
5.2.2 Verifying a function 
To verify a function, a SW interface containing a register with the function and an asser-
tion for the function were created. Assertion and design files were read into a FV tool. A 
configuration file for the tool was also included. The file included options and information 
about the DUV so that the tool knew how to handle it and what automatic checks and 
constraints it should create. These files were then compiled and elaborated with the de-
sired options to load the design into the tool. 
The tool provided formal assertion proving methods, which were used to check whether 
an assertion holds or not. The assertions could be checked separately, in selected groups 
or all at once. Checking fewer assertions at the same time reduced the runtime of assertion 
checks. This option was used often during the verification process.  
Figure 6 shows a capture of assertion check report screen of the FV tool. The figure shows 
the name of checked assertion(s), if the assertion was proved or not and the check runtime. 
Other information, such as validity of assertion check, could also be seen in this screen. 
If the assertion could be proved to either hold or fail, a witness or counterexample was 
produced.  
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Figure 6: Part of assertion check report screen. 
Even if the assertion did hold and a witness was created, further analyzing had to be done 
to see if the assertion was verifying correctly the function it should verify. From the report 
screen presented in Figure 6 it was possible to open the witness or counterexample report. 
In the opened window, the assertion source code and a waveform viewer were presented. 
Based on the waveforms and signal and port values, it was most of the time clear whether 
the assertion and the function were working as intended.  
In addition to reports provided by the FV tool, the VHDL implementation of the SW 
interface was analyzed manually by looking at the code. This code viewing helped to 
understand whether an assertion was failing because of a faulty assertion or incorrect 
implementation of the function. The VHDL implementation was viewed for every func-
tion but it was used more as an additional verification method to the FV tool reports.   
The coverage of SW interface VHDL implementation by the assertions was also checked 
as one step in function verification. The FV tool provided a feature, Quantify, that could 
analyze what parts of the interface code were considered or active when proving an as-
sertion [10]. With this feature, it was possible to see if an assertion truly verified the RTL 
implementation of the function it should verify. This coverage check was run after an 
assertion was already holding and seemed to be verifying what it should to see if the 
register code was fully covered.  
Verification tasks explained in this chapter were performed until it was sure that an as-
sertion was correctly composed to verify the function implementation it was supposed to 
verify. Bugs found in the function implementations would be reported further to be 
patched. The goal was that every function of SW interface would have an assertion cre-
ated to verify it. Section 5.4 describes how well this goal was actually met, including 
other results of this phase 1. 
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5.3 Example assertions 
This section presents three register function assertion examples. The assertions selected 
include functionality that is common in SW interfaces. They also consist of most of the 
different features used in the created assertions. 
The first assertion described is an assertion for input PORT function. This function creates 
an additional input port to the register, which can be used to write new data into the reg-
ister [18]. The assertion property is shown in Figure 7, where the input port is BASI-
CREG_IN and the register is reg_BASICREG_s. 
 
Figure 7: Assertion for input PORT function. 
The assertion evaluates on positive clock edges when reset is not active. The $changed 
SV function is used to notice the change in port value, which is the antecedent. Nonover-
lapping implication |=> means that the consequent checking is done on the next clock 
tick. In the consequent the register value is compared to the port value from the previous 
clock tick. If the function is correctly implemented to the register, the compared values 
should match and assertion will hold. This function was one of the easiest to create an 
assertion for and was very similar to output PORT function assertion.  
The second assertion example is for output DELAY function. The DELAY function was 
always used with a PORT function to create an output port for a register, which would 
show a register value after a defined delay [18]. The delay is measured in clock cycles. 
The assertion is displayed in Figure 8, where the DELAY_REG2_OUT is the output port 
and reg_DELAYREG2_s is the register. 
 
Figure 8: Assertion for output DELAY function. 
For this assertion, a property with a parameter was used. The parameter was an integer 
number that defined how long a delay there should be until the register value is visible in 
the output port. This allowed the same property to be used for all delay functions with 
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different delays. The delay is implemented with syntax ##delay, where the delay is re-
placed by the integer parameter. Otherwise, the assertion checks that when the register 
value changes, the output port value should match that value after the defined delay.  
The last assertion example is for CLEAR function. The function causes the register con-
tent to be cleared when a defined port has a certain value [18]. In this assertion, the port 
is CLEARPORT and the register is reg_CLEARPORTREG_s. The assertion is shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Assertion for clear function. 
The assertion is evaluated on positive clock edges, when reset is inactive. This assertion 
requires that a register write operation does not happen at the same time. The register is 
implemented in RTL so that, if this condition is not included in the assertion, a simulta-
neous bus write could override the register content clear. This would cause the assertion 
to fail. It takes one clock cycle from the clear condition being true to register content 
being cleared, which is described with the nonoverlapping implication. 
5.4 Results  
Table 9 presents the results of this phase. Every SW interface function is included. Func-
tions with and without assertion are annotated with different coloring. Also, wanted and 
unwanted results are marked with different color. Table 9 shows if the function had an 
assertion created, did it hold and were any additional constraints required. The table also 
tells if the function RTL implementation was fully covered with an assertion or not.  
 
Table 9: Phase 1 results 
  No assertion created for this function 
  Failed/unwanted result 
  Correct/wanted result 
 
Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
created 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Input NONE no       
Input PORT no       
30 
 
Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
created 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Input PORT <name> yes yes no full 
Input PORT_MAX no       
Input PORT_MAX <name> yes yes no full 
Input LEVEL0 yes yes no full 
Input LEVEL1 yes yes no full 
Input LEVEL0 <enable_port_name> no       
Input 
LEVEL0 <enable_port_name>; 
PORT <port name> yes yes no full 
Input LEVEL1 <enable_port_name> no       
Input 
LEVEL1 <enable_port_name>; 
PORT <port name> yes yes no full 
Input 
LEVEL0 <register name>.<field 
name> ; PORT <port name> yes yes no full 
Input 
LEVEL1 <register name>.<field 
name> ; PORT <port name> yes yes no full 
Input EDGES0 yes yes no full 
Input EDGES1 yes yes no full 
Input EDGE01 no       
Input EDGE10 no        
Input EDGE01S0 yes yes no full 
Input EDGE01S1 yes yes no full 
Input EDGE10S0 yes yes no full 
Input EDGE10S1 yes yes no full 
Input REG OR <reg>.<field> yes yes no full 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> OR 
<register name> yes yes no full 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> AND 
<register name> yes yes no full 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> XOR 
<register name> yes yes no full 
Input 
REG_COND <register_name> 
<op> <value> 
some 
cases yes no full 
Input 
REG_COND <regis-
ter_name>.<field_name> <op> 
<value>] 
some 
cases yes no full 
Input 
REG_OP_LOOP <OR|AND> <in-
dex_var> <start_expr> 
<end_expr> <operand> yes yes no full 
Input PORT ; STROBE no       
Input 
PORT <port name>; STROBE 
<port name> yes yes no partial 
Input PORT ; SYNC=<n> no       
Input PORT <port name>; SYNC=<n> yes yes no full 
Input PORT ; SYNC=cnsyncax001 no       
Input PORT ; SYNC=<name> yes yes no full 
Input PORT ; DELAY=<n> no       
Input PORT <port name>; DELAY=<n> yes yes no partial 
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Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
created 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Input 
SET <0|1> WHEN 
<READ|WRITE> ACTIVE 
<name> yes yes no full 
Output NONE no       
Output PORT no       
Output PORT <name> yes yes no full 
Output 
PORT <name>(<number> 
downto <number>) no       
Output PORT; DELAY=<delay> no       
Output PORT <name>; DELAY=<delay> yes yes no partial 
Output 
PORT <name>(<number> 
downto <number>); DE-
LAY=<delay> no       
Output 
PORT; CLOCK <name>; RESET 
<name> no       
Output 
PORT; CLOCK <name>; RESET 
<name>; SYNC=<name> no       
Output 
PORT <name>; CLOCK <name>; 
RESET <name> no       
Output 
PORT <name>; CLOCK <name>; 
RESET <name>; SYNC=<name> yes yes no full 
Output <op> yes yes no partial 
Output <op>_INPUT yes yes no full 
Output STROBE yes yes no partial 
Output PULSE; PORT no       
Output PULSE; PORT <port name> yes yes no full 
Output REG_PULSE no       
Output 
MUX <select> <output> <in-
put> <input> ... yes yes no partial 
Internal ID no       
Internal <type>_<op> no       
Register <register name> no       
Internal WIRE yes yes no full 
Internal CONSTANT yes yes no full 
Internal BUS_ERROR no       
Internal POSTED_WRITE_ERROR no       
Set REG <register>.<field>=<value> yes yes no full 
Set 
REG 
<register>(<index>)=<value> no       
Set 
PORT <in-
put_port_name>=<value> yes yes no full 
Set 
PORT <input_port_name>(<in-
dex>)=<value> yes yes no partial 
Clear REG <register>.<field>=<value> no       
Clear 
REG 
<register>(<index>)=<value> yes yes no full 
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Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
created 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Clear 
PORT <in-
put_port_name>=<value> yes yes no full 
Clear 
PORT <input_port_name>(<in-
dex>)=<value> yes yes no partial 
Enable 
<REG|PORT> 
<expression>=<value> yes yes no full 
Enable 
<REG|PORT> <expres-
sion>=<value>;PARTIAL no       
Misc <UVM access type> no       
Misc <memory name>(<expr>) no       
Misc 
<memory 
name>(<expr>)(<data range>) no       
  Wait Read <number> no       
  Wait Read Port no       
  Read Active Port no       
  Write Active Port no       
 
There were multiple reasons why a function did not have an assertion created for it. Ma-
jority of the functions that did not get an assertion could be covered by assertions created 
for other functions or at least with a very similar assertion. For example, if there was a 
function with two versions that were defined either with or without PORT <name> op-
tion, an assertion was created only for the one with the PORT <name>. This was accepta-
ble as checking the most complex one would prove that the simpler ones could also be 
verified with an assertion. The same reason also applied for EDGE01 and EDGE10 func-
tions as they were covered by the assertions of more complex EDGE functions. 
One function had no assertion because it was not correctly implemented by the generator 
script. This function was REG_PULSE, which should create an internal signal to the SW 
interface that would show a one clock cycle pulse when the register is written. The register 
generated did not have this kind of functionality at all. This bug had gone unnoticed be-
cause the function was hardly used. No assertion was created for this function as plans to 
remove it completely from the SW interface emerged after this find. 
A few function types were considered too difficult to verify with assertions. ID function 
was used to create a register to identify the SW interface. It contained constant parameters 
that should not be changed after the interface creation. It was seen unnecessary to write 
assertions for this function. Miscellaneous functions were for either mapping an external 
memory to the register address space or for providing register field access for universal 
verification methodology (UVM) test benches [21]. The memory related functions would 
have required an external memory to be connected to the interface. This meant that the 
assertions would have needed to cover also the memory blocks, which was out of scope 
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of this study. The UVM related function was already obsolete as other methods had re-
placed it, so no assertion for it was needed. 
The assertions that were created performed well in register function verification. Every 
assertion proved to hold when a function was implemented correctly. None of the asser-
tions required additional constraints as all needed conditions for related input and signal 
values could be included in the assertion itself. However, the code coverage of RTL im-
plementation of registers was not satisfying. The coverage was a sum of RTL code being 
activated with FV tool RW assertions, which verified the bus, and the manually created 
function assertions. About one third of all register implementations were not fully covered 
by their assertions.  
In this phase, assertions for most of the SW interface functionality added with register 
functions were created. However, some assertions did not fully cover the whole RTL 
implementation and functionality of the registers they were supposed to verify. In addi-
tion, the assertions did not have a uniform structure. Every assertion had been created 
individually without thinking of generalized structure. These problems meant that the as-
sertions created in this phase were not good enough for the verification of a SW interface. 
However, further development of assertions was encouraged by the fact that they could 
perform well in interface function verification. The assertions should be enhanced so that 
they would completely cover the RTL implementation of SW interface registers. This 
could be achieved if the assertion could cover all possible ways to write, read or otherwise 
use the register value. The assertions should also have more general structure for easier 
understanding. A uniform structure would also make it easier to design a generation script 
for the assertions, which would automatize the assertion creation. These improvements 
were the specific tasks to be done in phase 2. 
34 
 
6. PHASE 2: ENHANCING PHASE 1 ASSERTIONS  
Phase 2 of this thesis was about enhancing the assertions created in phase 1. Assertions 
had to cover RTL implementation of the register completely. They also needed to have 
as uniform structure as possible to ease assertion generation script development in the 
future. The idea of how this could be achieved was to integrate the assertions created into 
phase 1 to the register bus read and write assertions generated by the FV tool. By doing 
this, the register could be covered end-to-end with fewer assertions that would share a 
similar structure. This chapter describes the improved structure of the assertions with a 
couple of examples. 
6.1 Structure of an enhanced assertion 
The FV tool used in SW interface verification could generate assertions for the AXI4Lite 
bus read and write accesses to the interface registers. Figure 10 shows a generated read 
access assertion for a register called REG1. 
 
Figure 10: Generated assertion for AXI4Lite read operation. 
In Figure 10, the assertion antecedent triggers when read operation is noticed to success-
fully complete on the AXI4Lite bus. After that, the read value, RDATA (retrieved with 
AXI4Lite_handle_byte_enable function) is compared to the register value stored by the 
FV tool. The RDATA and stored register value have to match and an OKAY (2’b00) re-
sponse must be received from the DUV for the assertion to hold. Otherwise, an error is 
reported. 
Figure 11 presents the bus write assertion generated for the same register. Here, the as-
sertion checks that when a bus write operation happens, an OKAY (2’b00) response is 
received from the DUV.  
 
Figure 11: Generated assertion for AXI4Lite write operation. 
These autogenerated assertions of the FV tool are insufficient to verify SW interface func-
tionality. Their purpose is to verify the bus protocol correctness which they do, but the 
SW interface functionality added with register functions is not verified. However, they 
could be improved to better or even completely verify the functionality of a register.  
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In the bus write assertion, it is not explicitly checked if the written data will make its way 
to the register. Due to this, the assertion does not provide complete code or functional 
coverage of the register write operation. The assertion would require a comparison be-
tween register data and WDATA to be added to the consequent to check that the data is 
really written into the register. This was tested with a couple of registers to see that it 
makes the assertion to fully cover the code and functionality of the register write opera-
tion. However, this modification was not implemented to all bus write assertions of every 
register because many of them had the bus write operation overridden by the register 
function functionality.  
A function get_comp_value, which returns the actual register value of the DUV, a defined 
number of clock cycles earlier, was added to the read assertion. It replaced the variable 
originally holding the register value stored by the FV tool. This means that the RDATA 
was now compared with the register source value from an appropriate point of time some 
clock cycles before. The function takes the source name, which can be, e.g., a register, 
signal or port, of the input value and the amount of delay in clock cycles. The function is 
shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Function for bus read assertion. 
 
For some SW interface functions, their functionality could be included in the FV tool 
assertions with the function presented in Figure 12. In this case, end-to-end coverage of 
register functionality was achieved by only modifying the bus read assertion. However, 
this was not possible for all SW interface functions. For those functions, only the register 
value was returned by the function and a separate assertion was created to verify the SW 
interface register function functionality. The separate assertion had a property defined on 
its own, which was then asserted to allow the reuse of the property, like in phase 1. These 
separate assertions were in most cases the same assertions already created in phase 1. The 
FV tool bus write assertion could also be modified to verify a couple of SW interface 
functions. However, a bus read assertion was still needed to achieve complete coverage 
of the register functionality. Examples of all different types of assertions are given in the 
next section. 
6.2 Examples of enhanced assertions 
The first enhanced assertion example is for the same register with an input PORT function 
as covered in section 5.3. The function adds a dedicated input port for the register [18]. 
The input port value is always written to the register as the RTL implementation for the 
register is such that the input port value always overwrites the value possibly coming 
through the bus. The assertion for this register is the FV tool bus read assertion with the 
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function get_comp_value described in Figure 12 added to it. The function returns the 
value of register input port from three clock cycles ago to be compared with the read 
register value, RDATA. The input port value is taken from three clock cycles ago because 
it is the time it takes for the value to be written into the register and then be visible in the 
RDATA, if it is immediately read by the bus. With this assertion, an end-to-end coverage 
of the register could be achieved. The assertion is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Enhanced assertion for input PORT function. 
The second example is for the same register with output DELAY function as presented in 
section 5.3. A dedicated output port is created that shows the register value with a defined 
delay [18]. This functionality could not easily be integrated into the bus read assertion 
because of the separate output port. Only the get_comp_value function was included in 
read assertion to return a register value from two clock cycles ago to the comparison. The 
delay is one clock cycle less than in the first example, because the retrieved value was not 
the input port value as in the first example. The modified read assertion is shown in Figure 
14. 
 
Figure 14: Enhanced assertion for output DELAY function. 
Since the bus read assertion could not be modified to verify DELAY function functional-
ity, it had to be done in a separate assertion. The assertion is almost the same as the one 
created in phase 1 for this register. It checks that when the output port value changes, the 
new output port value equals the register value defined a given number of clock cycles 
ago. The number of clock cycles was defined in the DELAY function definition. This 
precise definition of delay in the assertion differs from the parametrized delay of the as-
sertion in phase 1. This approach was chosen because it makes it less complicated and a 
new assertion would anyway be required for every new register. The separate assertion 
property is presented in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Output DELAY function property. 
The third example is for the same register with CLEAR function as in section 5.3. It adds 
an input port that can be used for clearing register content by writing a certain value to 
the port [18]. This functionality was not feasible to be integrated into the bus write or 
read assertion. However, a similar approach as for the register with a DELAY function 
could be used for this register function. The get_comp_value function was added to bus 
read assertion and the phase 1 assertion was used to separately verify the CLEAR function 
functionality to achieve complete coverage of the register. 
Some registers with added functionality could be verified by adding a different function 
than get_comp_value to the bus read assertion. An example of this is a register with 
REG_OP function. This function causes the register value to be the result of AND, OR or 
XOR operation of two different register contents. The result is always stored in the register 
as it overwrites the bus write operation. The register could therefore be completely veri-
fied by adding a function that returns the computed to the comparison with RDATA in the 
bus read assertion. The assertion for a register with this functionality is shown in Figure 
16. 
 
Figure 16: Enhanced input REG_OP function assertion. 
Few register functions could be verified by modifying the bus write assertion. Input DE-
LAY function adds a delay to the bus write operation [18]. The written value is visible in 
the register after a defined delay. The delay is measured in clock cycles. The bus write 
assertion was modified to include an antecedent condition of WSTRB signal being ‘1’ for 
the defined delay number of clock cycles before allowing the register value to be changed 
(refer to [20] for further details). When a bus write occurred and WSTRB allowed register 
content to be changed, the assertion checked that write response was OK (2’b00) and that 
the register value was the WDATA value from the defined delay amount of cycles before. 
The assertion is shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Enhanced input DELAY function assertion. 
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7. RESULTS OF SW INTERFACE VERIFICATION 
This chapter presents the combined results of the two phases of assertion-based FV done 
on the SW interface functionality. The results cover all SW interface functionality that 
was verified with the methods described in section 5.2.2. Comparison between the two 
phases and the metrics that present how well the set goals were met are also included. 
Section 5.4 already described the results of phase 1 in detail and explained, why some 
register functions were not separately verified. The functions that were not verified could 
either be verified with an assertion created for other, more complex version of the same 
function. Also, some of the functions were found out to be bugged or redundant before 
an assertion was created, or the function was not simply feasible to verify with an asser-
tion, which is why no assertion was created for them. These functions were not verified 
in phase 2 either and were therefore excluded from the results table. 
Table 10 shows the results of register functionality verification from phase 1 and 2. It tells 
if the assertion(s) created held on a register with correct register function implementation 
and fired when the implementation was wrong. Also, the need for possible additional 
constraints is shown. Assertion coverage column describes if the assertion(s) covered the 
functionality and code of the register with a function completely or not. Multiple asser-
tions column shows if more assertions than only the SW interface bus read and write 
assertions were required for the whole register verification. The color coding used in the 
table is presented above it.  
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Table 10: Verification results 
  Failed/unwanted result 
  Correct/wanted result 
 
  Phase 1    Phase 2    
Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Input PORT <name> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input PORT_MAX <name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input LEVEL0 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input LEVEL1 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
LEVEL0 <enable_port_name>; PORT 
<port name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
LEVEL1 <enable_port_name>; PORT 
<port name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
LEVEL0 <register name>.<field name> 
; PORT <port name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
LEVEL1 <register name>.<field name> 
; PORT <port name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGES0 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGES1 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGE01S0 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGE01S1 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGE10S0 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input EDGE10S1 yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input REG OR <reg>.<field> yes no full yes yes no full no 
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  Phase 1    Phase 2    
Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> OR <regis-
ter name> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> AND <regis-
ter name> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input 
REG_OP <register name> XOR 
<register name> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input 
REG_COND <register_name> <op> 
<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
REG_COND <regis-
ter_name>.<field_name> <op> 
<value>] yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Input 
REG_OP_LOOP <OR|AND> <in-
dex_var> <start_expr> <end_expr> 
<operand> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input 
PORT <port name>; STROBE <port 
name> yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Input PORT <port name>; SYNC=<n> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input PORT ; SYNC=<name> yes no full yes yes no full no 
Input PORT <port name>; DELAY=<n> yes no partial yes yes no full no 
Input 
SET <0|1> WHEN <READ|WRITE> AC-
TIVE <name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Output PORT <name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Output PORT <name>; DELAY=<delay> yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Output 
PORT <name>; CLOCK <name>; RESET 
<name>; SYNC=<name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Output <op> yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
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  Phase 1    Phase 2    
Function 
type Syntax 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Assertion 
holds 
Constraint 
required 
Assertion 
coverage 
Multiple 
assertions 
Output <op>_INPUT yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Output STROBE yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Output PULSE; PORT <port name> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Output 
MUX <select> <output> <input> <in-
put> ... yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Internal WIRE yes no full yes yes no full no 
Internal CONSTANT yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Set REG <register>.<field>=<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Set PORT <input_port_name>=<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Set 
PORT <input_port_name>(<in-
dex>)=<value> yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Clear REG <register>(<index>)=<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Clear PORT <input_port_name>=<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
Clear 
PORT <input_port_name>(<in-
dex>)=<value> yes no partial yes yes no full yes 
Enable <REG|PORT> <expression>=<value> yes no full yes yes no full yes 
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The first thing to note from the results is that in both phases assertions to verify correct 
implementations of registers with a register function could be created. Phase 1 assertions 
could verify correct implementation of the functionality added with register functions. 
This meant that the non-working register functions were already discovered in phase 1. 
However, there was only a function REG_PULSE that was bugged.   
The second thing to note is that the assertions were created and checked without any 
additional constraints to block certain design behavior. The included constraints were 
only to ensure that the FV tool used valid bus protocol behavior and input data. The ab-
sence of overconstraining was desired because restricting some otherwise valid input be-
havior to allow a certain assertion to work would prevent some other functionality of the 
SW interface from occurring. Overconstraining was not needed because the required con-
ditions could be included in the created assertions.  
The differences between phase 1 and 2 results come from the functional and code cover-
age of register functionality and required amount of assertions to achieve the coverage. 
In phase 1, roughly one third of the possible register functionality could not be completely 
verified with the bus RW and the register function assertions. In phase 2, when these two 
assertion types were integrated as fully as possible into each other, all relevant register 
functionality could be verified.  
The only functionalities that were not covered with phase 2 assertions were the reset value 
setting of most registers and the bus write operation of some registers. The reset value 
setting was not checked because all created assertions were disabled during reset. How-
ever, proper usage of the default register values was covered immediately after reset by 
the assertions. In addition, the reset values were correct for all defined registers so the 
register value setting is working as intended. The bus write operation was not covered for 
those registers that it was redundant. Figure 18 presents the RTL code for a register with 
a dedicated input port. Assertion created for that register was presented in section 6.2. It 
provided end-to-end coverage of the register by checking in bus read assertion that the 
input port value is always seen after a proper delay in the output port. In this figure, it can 
be seen that the reset value setting is not covered and that the bus write is not covered due 
to it being redundant functionality and therefore, not verified by the assertion for this 
register. 
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Figure 18: Quantify code coverage snapshot. 
 
Figure 19: Quantify structural coverage overview. 
The coverage was assessed from the FV tool Quantify reports combined with the infor-
mation if the assertion could verify the correct behavior based on the witness and coun-
terexample reports of the FV tool. A Quantify structural coverage report of a SW interface 
with all phase two assertions included is presented in Figure 19. The report shows that 
roughly 60% of the design structures were exhaustively covered by the assertions. The 
reason why the number is so low is because of the bus write operations and register reset 
value setting. As noted in section 6.1, the FV tool bus write assertions did not check that 
the written value really ended up to the register. A simple added comparison would have 
improved the assertion to cover this.  It was tested on few registers that the improved bus 
write assertion can cover the register write completely. These improvements were left out 
from the assertion checking due to them being similar for any register and would have 
just taken development and verification time to add them for every register. In addition, 
the bus write operation was redundant for many registers due to being overridden by the 
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functionality added with a register function. For these reasons, the bus write operation 
code is not observed by any assertion for majority of the registers. This and the fact that 
reset value setting was not checked caused the total coverage to be relatively low. How-
ever, the coverage of the relevant register code and functionality was 100%. A more de-
tailed report of the coverage of individual assertions is included in Appendix A. The re-
port in the appendix also shows some not proven assertions that were created by the FV 
tool. These assertions checked bus features not present in the design, which caused them 
to be inconclusive.  
Phase 1 assertions for register functions were tried to be integrated into FV tool bus RW 
assertions to reduce the number of assertions needed and to have a more uniform structure 
with the different assertions. As seen from Table 10, only about one third of the registers 
with functions could be completely verified with only modified bus RW assertions. Many 
functions added an additional port or a method to change, read or use the register value 
that was not compatible enough with the bus RW assertions to be integrated into them. 
Still, a lower total number of assertions with more general structure was achieved in phase 
2, which is better for potential assertion generation script development. 
One difference between phase 1 and 2 not visible in Table 10 was the increased runtime 
of assertion checking in phase 2 compared to phase 1. The runtime of a single assertion 
check was in the worst cases increased from few seconds to some tens of seconds. Also, 
the Quantify runtimes increased significantly. This was caused by the fact that the phase 
2 assertions were more complex than the assertions in phase 1. The runtimes are not a 
problem for a smaller scale SW interface like the ones used in this thesis. However, for 
larger SW interfaces with hundreds or even thousands of registers that can have multiple 
functions defined to them, the runtimes would further increase and could become an issue. 
It is not feasible to run assertion checks that last for tens of hours if it needs to be done 
multiple times for a single SW interface. However, the checks would be usually run, when 
the SW interface changes, which should not happen often in a single project. In that case, 
the longer runtime of assertion checks does not matter that much.   For larger SW inter-
faces, assertion checks could be run with a limited set of assertions and/or with a lower 
effort level to reduce the checking time. 
The verified SW interface had only registers with a single function. It is allowed to define 
multiple functions for a single register. The registers with multiple functions could be 
verified by combining the assertions created for individual register functions. These mul-
tiple function cases were out of the scope of this thesis but would be one of the first steps 
to be considered if an assertion generation script was created.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this thesis was to develop a new assertion-based formal verification method 
to verify SoC module SW interfaces used in Nokia. The developed method was meant to 
support or replace the former simulation-based verification methods. This required mod-
elling the design intent by creating assertions and then using FV tool assertion checks to 
verify the SW interface RTL implementation. From the results, suggestions could be 
made if and on what scale a new assertion-based FV platform could be utilized in SW 
interface verification. 
The assertion creation and SW interface verification were done in two phases. In the first 
phase, assertions for the SW interface register functions were created. These assertions 
were used with the bus RW assertions created by the FV tool to verify if SW interfaces 
were generated correctly. The assertion-based FV performed well in SW interface verifi-
cation as some bugs were found and the functionality added with register functions could 
be fully verified with the created assertions. However, the coverage of the design code 
was not good enough, and the assertions did not have a uniform structure. This meant that 
improvements were needed.  
In the second phase, the assertions from first phase were enhanced by integrating them as 
well as possible into the FV tool bus RW assertions. This provided a better coverage of 
the design code and functionality with fewer and more similarly created assertions. Still, 
many register functions required a separate assertion in addition to the bus RW assertions. 
However, nearly complete code and functional coverage of the SW interface was 
achieved with the new assertions with tolerable verification runtimes. This is better than 
what the current simulation-based methods can provide. 
The developed assertion-based FV platform could provide a new way to verify SW inter-
faces. A full coverage of the design could be achieved with acceptable runtimes. How-
ever, a relatively simple SW interface was used in the experiments. A larger and more 
complex SW interface would take much more effort and time to be verified with this 
approach. Also, a generation script for the assertions would be required to make their 
creation easier since manually defining them takes a lot of time. Therefore, the platform 
in its current state suits best for smaller or for partial verification of larger SW interfaces. 
Still, it can be said that this thesis achieved its goals. Assertions verifying SW interface 
functionality were created. The SW interface generation flow was verified and the several 
found bugs were fixed so it is in a better condition now than before this thesis. A platform 
to develop an assertion generation script to enable automated additional verification 
method for SW interfaces was produced. The developed platform should in its current 
state be considered as an additional way to verify small or parts of bigger SW interfaces. 
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APPENDIX A: QUANTIFY ASSERTION COVERAGE REPORT 
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Figure 20: Quantify assertion coverage report. 
 
 
 
 
